The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction by Leo Grebler
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction





Chapter Title: New Housebuilding under FHA and VA Programs
Chapter Author: Leo Grebler
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9295
Chapter pages in book: (p. 16 - 28)New Housebuilding under FHAand VA Programs
From 1935 through 1951, almost 4- million new dwelling units
were financed with mortgageloans insured by the Federal Hous-
ing Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration.
This number represents about 40 per cent of all new dwelling
units built during this period, and equals more than half the entire
volume constructed during the twenties. Of the 4 million dwelling
units, over 2,4 million were financed with FHA and VA loans
made during the six postwar years 1946 to 1951. How the size of
these programs changed over time is shown in Chart A and Table 1.
The number of new dwelling units financed1 with mortgage
1The terms "financed with" and "built with" FHA insured or VA guaranteed
mortgage loans require qualification. The data for new dwelling units built
under FHA auspices are based on "first compliance" inspections and denote
starts of dwelling units. A varying proportion of dwelling units built with
FHA inspection have been sold upon completion with conventional mortgage
financing or, since 1945, with mortgage loans guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration. After June 1950, the data for new dwelling units built under
VA auspices are also based on compliance inspections. For preceding periods,
they represent rough estimates by the Housing and Home Finance Agency of
the starts of new dwelling units sold with VA-guaranteed first mortgage loans.
In terms of final financing of the acquisition of new residential construction,
the data overstate somewhat the importance of FHA.insured loans and under-
state somewhat the importance of VA-guaranteed loans. Thus the combined
FHA and VA totals are more accurate than the separate data for FHA and
VA. Any overstatement of the combined ratio of new units financed with
FHA and VA loans to total units should be small. Cases in which construction
was started with either an FHA or VA loan but finally financed with a conven-
tional mortgage are at least partially offset by cases in which houses were
started with conventional loans but sold upon completion with FHA-insured
mortgage financing or VA-guaranteed loans. The above qualifications apply to
Chart A, Tables 1 and B, and all text references to ratios of new dwelling units
financed or built with FHA and VA loans to the total number of dwelling units.
Moreover, the timing of starts as estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and of starts based on FHA and VA compliance inspections is not quite
synchronous. These differences are minor and do not affect the orders of
magnitude.
16loans insured by FHA increased rapidly from 1935 to 1941 and
represented about one-third of all new dwelling units started dur-
ing the three years preceding Pearl Harbor, as against 6 and 16
per cent, respectively, in 1935 and 1936. The relative importance
of FHA-insured loans in the financing of new construction rose
sharply during World War II in conjunction with the war housing
program. During these years, more generous mortgage insurance
benefits were employed under Title VI of the National Housing
TABLEI
New Nonfarm Dwelling Units Financed under FHA and




SOURCE: See Table 8 for absolute numbers, sources, and note,.
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(4) (5) (6) (7)
1935 6 .... 6 7 7 3
1936 16 16 19 19 1
1937 18 18 20 20 6
1938 30 30 32 32 18
1939 35 35 37 37 20
1940 34 34 37 37 6
1941 36 36 39 39 6
1942 55 55 59 59 18
1943 79 79 82 82 67
1944 67 67 67 67 69
1945 20 3 23 20 3 23 15
1946 10 13 23 II 13 24 4
1947 27 25 52 23 27 50 71
1948 32 11 43 26 13 39 75
1949 36ii 47 30 13 43 69
1950 36 15 51 27 17 44 99
1951 26 15 41 20 16 36 89I
Act to overcome the anticipated risks involved in the location of
war housing, the reduced construction standards imposed by mate-
rials i-estrirtioti, and the credit standing of the mortgage borrowers.
In 1943 almost 80 per cent of all privately financednew dwelhiig
units were started under the FHA program.
In 1915 the home loan guarantee provisions of the Veterans
Administration, under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of1 944-,
began to operate. Nevertheless, the relative importanceof the
FHA and VA programs combined was low in 1945 and1946,
accounting for only 23 per cent of the total number of(lWelling
units started. From 1947 through 1951, however,approximately
one-half of all privately financed new dwelling unitswere acquired
with loans insured hFl-IA or guaranteed h VA, as againstthe
maximum of one-third i-cached before World War IIunder the
FHA program alone. The increased proportion ofconstruction
under these government aids was accompaniedor preceded by
the introduction of more liberal creditor guaranty terms for both
Fl-IA and VA mortgages, until the Korean conflictcaused the
introduction of credit curbs in the summer and fallof 1950. The
credit restrictions and the withdrawal of rigid FederalRescn'e
support of government securities, which tendedto raise bond
yields and made investment in FHA and VAloans at fixed maxi-
mum interest rates less attractive, account for the decline inthe
proportion of new dwelling units financed withgovernment-
insured mortgages from 1950to 1951.
In addition to FHA and VA loanson new construction,2 other
government aids, such as the Home Owners' LoanCorporation,
the credit facilities of the FederalHome Loan Banks, and the
investment of federal funds in savingsand loan associations, have
had an influence on the volume ofresidential building at various
times since 1933. Their effects,however, have been less direct than
those of the FHA and VAprograms. Several states and cities have
developed financial aids forprivately sponsored new construction,
particularly for the benefit ofveterans, hut their aggregate impor-
tance has been small. The influence ofthe operations of the Federal
National Mortgage Associationis discussed in Section III.
For simplicity, the terms FHA loansand VA loans are used to denote mort-
gage loans insured by the Federal HousingAdministration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
18CHART A
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A: Sum of columns 1 and 4 for FHA and VA, and column 5 minus nuns of columns 1
and 4 for conventional.
B Sum of columns 2 and 4 for FHA and VA, and column 6 minus sum of columns 2
and 4 for conventional.
C: Column 3 for FHA, and column 7 minus column 3 for conventional.
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C.Rental Units
200 - FHA and VA
loans
100 Conventional loansI
For a review of the effects of FHA and VA aidson new privately
financed residential construction, at least three relatedquestions
suggest themselves. Have these programs increased the total vol-
ume of rcsidcntial building uvet and above the level that would
have been attained without them? Have they widenedthe market
for new dwellings, by reducing carryingcosts toapoint where
occupancy of new housing became possible for buyers andrenters
who otherwise would have been unableto afford new housing?
Have they changed the distribution ofnew construction as between
dwellings for sale and rent?
Effects on the Volume of Construction
The question as to the precise impactof FHA and VA aids on
total residential building activity will foreverremain unanswer-
able. There is no basis for estimatingwhat the level and movement
of residential construction wouldhave been without the federal
programs.
It would he rash toassume that all of the new construction
financed with FHA and VA loansrepresents additional volume
that would not have been producedwithout these aids. Much of
the building sponsored underthe FHA and VA programs would
probably have occurred without them,for the two facilities have
operated largely in a period of risingor high incomes conducive
to an expanding demand for new residentialconstruction. It would
he equally rash to deduce that theseprograms had no influence on
the volume of residential construction.
There is some reason for believingthat the FHA program in the
mid- and late thirties helpedto accelerate the expansion of resi-
dential buildingwhich was indeed its principalpurpose. Recov-
ery in housing construction is usually dependentupon substantial
improvement in occupancy and prices andrents of existing facili-
ties, and on the abatement offoreclosures and distress sales. By
1935when the FHA mortgage insurancesystem began to operate,
residential real estate markets inmost areas had only moderately
recovered from the Great Depression. Therefinancing program of
the Home Owners' Loan Corporationwas still in progress. Fore-
20closures were still at a high level though declining. The rent index
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics reached bottom in 1935 and
remained low in the next few years. Residential vacancies were
still high.3 In the face of these obstacles there would probably have
been even less recovery in residential construction during the
second half of the thirties had it not been for the FHA program.
Moreover, if government credit aids succeeded in continuously
widening the market for new housing, they tended to raise the
level of new construction. Many changes in federal housing poli-
cies since the middle thirties may, in fact, be interpreted as efforts
to widen the market for new residential facilities by differential
credit terms favoring lower-priced dwelling units and lower income
groups. It is important, therefore, to trace briefly the development
of this objective and to indicate the extent to which it has been met.
Widening the Market
The change in the orientation of the FHA-insurance program fur-
nishes an instructive record on this point. Hearings and Congres-
sional debates leading to its enactment in 1934 reveal an almost
exclusive concern with stimulation of residential construction and
home purchase and modernization, as part of an economic recov-
ery program, and with improvement of the mortgage system. There
is hardly any reference to the possibility of using FHA-insurance
as a device for making new or better housing available to con-
sumers who would otherwise be unable to afford it. The emphasis
was on encouragement of mortgage lenders to lend rather than on
encouragement of consumers to borrow. Subsequent legislation,
however, has given the FHA an increasing consumer orientation.
The terms of FHA-insured loans have been more and more differ-
'Nonfarm real estate foreclosures totaled 229,000 in 1935 as against a depres-
sion peak of 252,000 in 1933. The number declined to 185,000 in 1936, 151,000
in 1937, and 59,000 in 1941 (Foreclosure Reports of the Home Loan Bank
Board). The BLS rent index stood at 94.2 in 1935 and increased to 96.4 in
1936 and 100.9 in 1937, as against a level of roughly 140 to 150 in the twenties
(19351939 = 100). The Real Property Inventories for 64 cities revealed an
average vacancy ratio of 7.8 per cent on January 1, 1934, with a ratio of 12.9
per cent for 5-or-more family structures (David L. Wickens, Residential Real
Estates National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941, p. 22).
21entiated betwecn various price and rental groups on the basis of
social iseeds rather than of mortgage loan risks (although thcc
two ci iteria need not always be in conflict)fhis diflerentiatioti
has been carried so far that, under the Fl-IA terms operative in the
winter of1952,the minimum dowupayment on a house appraised
at $11 ,(X)() WaS al)oUt five tiiites as large as the minimumdown-
payment oil a house appraised at less than $7 ,00(l.
i'lfirst ste1) in this direction was a 1938 amendment to the
National Housing Act, which permitted easier credit terms for
newly constructed small liomes. The second step was the removal
of the "economic soundness" requirement for loans insured under
the wartime amendments to the Act. War housing financed with
FHA-msurcd loans was to be "channeled'' to war workers,many
of whom would be unable to buy houses without more liberal
financing and borrower credit ratings. The use of mortgage ins111-
ance for "channeling'' new housing into lower income groups was
transferred to the Veterans Emergency Housing Program of 1946,
which stated this use as one of its specific objectives.6 Congressional
hearings on comprehensive housing legislation during the latewar
and the postwar periods reveal a consistent emphasis on the devel-
opnlcnt of special financing tools for construction suited for
"middle-income families," the groups between those servedby
private enterprise with existing government aids and thoseto be
Lower-priced houses have a larger resale market andisiay therefore be
sounder security for mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios.
Miles L. Colcan, op. i-it., p. 98.
° 'Fheprogram, as announced by the Housing Epediter on February 7, 1946,
included the following recommendation: "Channeling the largestpart of mate-
rial into homes and rental housing, both farm and urban, selling fornot more
than $6,000 or renting or not snore than $50 per month" andspecified: "To
provide moderately priced homes with a maximum of rental units, itis neces-
sary for the government to offer greater incentives for the building ofsuch
housing. This can be achieved by insuringmortgages on low-cost homes for
builders to the extent of 90 per cent of value. Furthemsore,such mortgages
must be based on necessary current Costs of construction ratherthan on long-
term economic value and they should be amortizedover a long period."
(Mimeographed statenient of the Housing Expediter.These changes were
incorporated in amendments to Title VI ofthe National housing Act, enacted
May 22, 1946.
22served by publicly financed housing.1 Such tools were provided in
the Housing Acts of l948 and of l950.
The exteni tohidi the objcctivc of widening the market has
in fact been met is difficult to determine, even in the relatively
simple case of new single-family houses for owner-occupancy.
Some of the new programs are too recent to permit a judgment
of their effectiveness in this respect. The credit restrictions, issued
in 1950 upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and suspended
in September 1952, and the temporary materials restrictions
caused by the military preparedness programs tended to limit the
use of the financing tools enacted in 1948 and1950. Moreover,
the historical data required for assessing the influence of govern-
ment aids on the demand structure for new single-family houses
are not available. The FederalHousing Administration reports
the income distribution of purchasers of new single-family houses
financed under its mortgage insurance program. Similar informa-
tion exists for all purchasers in selected metropolitan districts for
recent years. But there are no comprehensive time series onthe
distribution of incomes of buyers of new houses, of purchase prices,
downpayments, and debt charges classified by government-insured
and conventional mortgage financing. However, a few observa-
tions are possible by comparing the characteristics of newhouse
'For example, Hearings before the Subcomtni!tee on Housing and UrbanRede-
uelopnsent of the Special Committee on Pos!war Economic Policy andPlanning,
pursuant to Senate resolution 102, particularly pp. 1301-5 (79Cong., 3 Sess.).
Also, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on5. /592,
(General Housing Act of 1946). No. 1131 (79 Cong., 2 Sess.).
Miles L. Colean, o. cit., pp. 124-5, particularly Nos. 5, 6, 7 and9.
'Public Law 475, 81st Congress, approved April 20, 1950. The principalfea-
tures of this Act designed to widen the market arespecial financing provisions
for cooperative housing (Section 213), and snore liberalfinancing tenus for
small homes (Sections 8 and 611), as well as for rental housing projects(Sec-
tion 207). These measures were taken "with the object ofencouraging greater
production of homes for middle-income families" (Fourth AnnualReport,
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1950, p. 213). In addition,the law
authorized a maximum of $150,000,000 in direct loans by the VeteransAdmin-
istration under specified conditions, increased the guaranty for VA homeloans
generally from 50 per cent of appraised value not to exceed$4,000 to 60 per




Distribution of Purchase Pricesof
New Owner.OccupiedSingle-Family Houses
Financed with Mortgage Loans,by Type of Mortgage Financing
1949 and 1950
Components do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Column 2 as a per cent of the sumof columns 2 and &
SOURCE: Based on Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Housing, Preliminazy
Reports, Mortgaged, Residential, Nonfarmn Properties Acquired During 1949
and First Half of 1950 (Series HC-9, No. 1), 'lable 5. The data are from a
sample survey and are subject to sampling errors detailed in the Census pub.
lication.
purchases financed with FHA and VA loans and of those financed
with conventional Inortgages during 1949 and 1950.
Purchases financed with government-insured loans are concen-
trated in the $6,000 to $12,000 price class (see Table 2). More
than four-fifths of all FHA- and VA-financed purchases, and only
two-fifths of purchases financed with conventional loans, fell into
this category. Within this price range, the government programs
operated largely in the $6,000 to $10,000 class. Almost two-thirds
of FHA- and VA-financed purchases, and only 28 per cent of
purchases with conventional loans, were for houses priced at
$6,000 to $10,000. On the other hand, only 4 per cent of all houses






FMA AND VA cONVENTIONAL OF TOTAL IN
FIRST MORTGAGESFIRST MORTGAGES EACH PRICE
Number Per Cent Number PerCtcLAssb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Less than $ 4,000 4,000 1 54,000 17 7
$ 4,000 to $ 5,999 13,000 3 43,000 14 23
$ (3,000 to $ 7,999 126,000 31 46,000 15 73
$ 9,000 to $ 9,999 139,000 34 42,000 13 77
$10,000 to $11,999 73,000 18 39,000 13
$12,000 to $13,999 27,000 7 25,000 8 52
$14,000 or more 27,000 7 64,000 21 30
Total reporting 407,000100' 312,000100 57$6,000, whereas almost one-third of the housespurchased with
conventional mortgages were in this pricegroup. Only 14 per cent
of all FHA- and VA-financed purchases,as against 29 per cent
of all purchases financed with conventional loans,were in the
price cla&s of $12,000 or more.
About three-fourths of all new mortgaged housesbought for
$6,000 to less than $12,000 were financed withgovernment-
insured loans (column 6 of Table 2). Here again, thecorrespond-
ing ratios for the lower-priced arid higher-priced housesare much
snialler.
Thus the federal programs were operative largely inthe medium
price field, with emphasis on the lowerrange of this field. Their
small share in the price class under $6,000may be due to failure
of many of these houses to meet minimum constructionstandards
of FHA and VA. Also, large numbers of lower-pricedhouses are
in small towns where FHA and VA facilitiesare less accessible
or are built in locations unacceptable for mortgage insuranceor
guaranty. In any event, the number of all houses in this price class
accounted for less than 1 6 per cent of the total.
Downpayments made on these purchases varied significantly
with type of financing. The median downpaymentwas 8 per cent
of the purchase price for houses bought with VA firstmortgages,
22 per cent for those bought with FHA first mortgages, and 35
per cent for those purchased with conventional first mortgages.1°
These differences in conjunction with the purchase price data
would suggest that reduction of downpayments through federal
insurance arid guarantee programs was a factor in stimulating
demand for medium- and low-priced houses which otherwise
would have been out of reach of many families.
Nevertheless, the evidence is by no means conclusive. The reduc-
tion of downpavments may have had the effect of causinga number
of house purchasers to devote a smaller proportion of their liquid
assets to this purpose than they would have done otherwise, or to
Based on Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Housing, Preliminary Re-
ports, Mortgages, Residential, Nonfarm Properties Acquired during 1949 and
First Half of 1950 (Series HC-9, No. I), Table 12. The data are from a sample
survey and are subject to sampling errors detailed in the Census publication.
25I
buy more cxpensive houses.11 Also, from a historical point of view,
downpayments have been reduced much less thana comparison
of maximum loan-to-value ratios for government-insured andfor
conventional loans would indicate. Before the institution of the
federal programs, junior mortgages often filled much of thegap
between purchase price and first mortgage. The substitution of
high-percentage first mortgages for combinations of first andjunior
loans would reduce carrying charges, other things being equal,But
other things have not been equal since the early thirties. The almost
universal inclusion of payments on principal in debt serviceon
single-family houses, thougha sounder financing practice, has
tended to absorb much of the advantage to borrowers resulting
from the consolidation of multiple loans into high-percentagefirst
mortgages at lower interest rates and for longer contract ternis.'2
Thus the extent to which the federalprograms have succeeded
in widening the market fornew construction is not determinable
from available data, butsonic progress in this direction has prob-
ably been made. At thesame time, widening the market for new
residential building has clearly emergedas a continuous and major
objective of federal housing policies andone that has direct hear-
ing on the volume of housing construction inthe long run.
Sales Housing Versus Rental Housing
Have the federal programs influenced the proportionsof new con-
struictjon for rental and sale? The FHA hasoften been accused of
"Thus a survey of purchases from October 1950to March 1951 revealed that
about one-fourth of house purchssers had leftover liquid assets valued at
$1,000 or more, and about one-tenth had liquidassets valued at $2,000 or
more, after purchase on terms prevalent before Regulation X(Federal Reserve
Bulletin, July 1951,p. 719). See also Daniel B. Rathbun, "Liquid Assets: A
Neglected Factor in the Formulation of housingFinance Policies," Journal of
Finance, December 1952, Vol. VII, No. 4.For the relationthip between
financing terms and purchase price,see Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate
Afarkegs: Characteristic5 and Financjn(National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1950), pp. 69-90.
° This point is examined ingreater detail in a chapter "Long-Term Chanes
in Cost and Terms of Mortgage Financing"in the forthcoming monograph. See
also "Influence on Cost and Terms ofFinancing," p. 49.
26unduly promoting housing for owner-occupancy;n and the veter-
ans home loan program is, of course, exclusively designed for pur-
chase (although some houses bought by veterans may include
additional dwelling units for rent in a small number of cases of
loans on structures with more than one dwelling unit).
The facts on this point are complex. On the statistical record,
the proportion of rental units in new multifamily structures to
the total number of new dwelling units was lower in the period
of FHA and VA operations than during any similar period since
the turn of the century - about 11.5 per cent for 1935 through
1951 14 Also, the volume of rental housing construction during the
recent postwar period was relatively low compared to a similar
period after World War I. From 1946 through 1951, less than
11 per cent of all new dwelling units were in multifamily structures
(Table 8). From 1920 through 1925, almost double this percent-
age was of the rental housing type.
It does not follow, however, that government aids for rental
housing were quantitatively less important in this field than in
housing for sale. It is true that before World WTar lithe propor-
tion of FHA-financed rental construction to total rental con-
struction was much lower than the proportion of FHA-financed
building for owner-occupancy to total building for owner-occu-
pancy (as is evident from a comparisonof columns 6 and 7 of
Table 1). But there was a reversal after the war. From 1947 to
1951, the proportion of FHA-flnanced rental construction to total
rental construction was mitch higher than the proportion of owner-
occupied housing built with both FHA and VA loans to total
building for owner-occupancy. During these five years, about 80
per cent of the annual productionof rental housing was financed
by FHA loans.
The two phenomena of the small relative importance ofrental
See, for example, Charles Abrams, The Future 0/ housing (Harper &
brothers, 1946), pp. 224-5.
'See Table fi for data 1935-1951, forthcoming monograph for data 1900-1934.
Multifamily structures are defined as structures with three or more dwelling
units. Structures with two dwelling units usually provide at least one unitfor
rent. The inclusion of these would increase the proportion ofunits for rent to
total units, hut would not change the statement that the 1935-1951 ratio was
lower than that during any similar period since 1900.
27housing since World War II andof the laige share of FHAfinanc- ing in rental housingcan be reconciled. Many factorsother than
tuvcfltincntal financial aids have influencedthe volume ofrental
housing construction. Amongthese are a possible long-termshift
in consumers preference forsingle-family houses, fortifiedby the
rise in real mcome and liquidassets since 194-0 and thetax advan-
tages of home ownership; thefinancial hazards of rentalhousing
construction during a period of rapidlychanging costs; anduncer-
tainties over the long-runearning capacity ofnew projects when
rent controls arc removcd)
To meet the obstaclesto rental housing constructionduring the
postwar period, and inresponse to public pressure fora greater
volume of rental housing,easy FHA financingarrangements under the wartime Section608 of the NationalHousing Actwere
renewed until 1950 andeven liberalized.'6 In spite of theseefforts, the quantity of buildingfor rent was relativelysmall, but the
overwhelming proportion of thissmall quantity was financedby liberal FHA loans.The rewards for rentalproject builders using
FHA financingwere unusually attractive. Inmany cases, builders
could fully or nearly"mortgage out"on loans representing 90per cent of "necessarycurrent Costs" and were ableto reap large profits
on very thin equities. That theseattractions did not produceany
larger volume of rentalhousing is perhapsa measure of the post-
war hazards of residentialconstruction for rent. It is safeto con- clude that the quantityof rental housing wouldhave been even
smaller if the liberalFHA aids hadnot existed.
Cf. Leo Grebler, 'Irnplictjo,of Rent Control- Experience in the United States," Internatjoflal LabourReview LXV, No. 4, April1952.
Among other things, theappraisal basis was changedfrom "reasonable replacement cost" to "necessarycurrent cost" and later to costsprevailing December 31, 1947, and highermaximum mortgageamounts per room were authorized
28